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EBITDA (EBDIT)

Origin: 1989 Letter Category: Tactical & Accounting

📖 Definition

EBITDA stands for Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization. In the 1989 Letter, Buffett refers to it as EBDIT (Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes) and describes it as a "sawed-off yardstick."

🧠 Buffett's Scathing Critique

Warren Buffett is perhaps the most famous critic of EBITDA as a valuation metric or measure of "cash flow." His primary objection is the exclusion of Depreciation.

Rationale: Depreciation is a Real Expense

Buffett argues that capital expenditures (which depreciation accounts for) are not optional for most businesses.

  • Quote: "At 95% of American businesses, capital expenditures that over time roughly approximate depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as real an expense as labor or utility costs."
  • Analogy: He compares skipping capital expenditures to a human skipping food. You can do it for a day or a week, but the body eventually weakens and dies.

The "Accounting Alchemy" of Junk Bonds

In the late 1980s, promoters used EBDIT to justify enormous leverage. Since depreciation doesn't require an immediate cash outlay, they argued it could be ignored when assessing a company's ability to pay interest.

  • Buffett's Stance: This is "clearly delusional."
  • Warning: "Whenever an investment banker starts talking about EBDIT... zip up your wallet."

💩 2002: "Bullshit Earnings"

In the 2002 Meeting, Buffett delivered perhaps his most visceral critique of the metric, famously labeling it "bullshit earnings."

The Moral and Intellectual Gap

Buffett argued that using EBITDA isn't just a technical error; it's a sign of a management team that is either delusional or dishonest.

  • The Capital Expenditure Reality: He reiterated that any manager who claims capital expenditures (Depreciation) aren't real expenses is effectively claiming that their machinery and plants will last forever without maintenance or replacement.
  • The Red Flag: Buffett and Munger both asserted that the mere mention of EBITDA by a CEO should make investors "zip up their wallets" and question the integrity of the entire financial report.

💬 Direct quotes

  • "I think you can almost say that about any management that uses EBITDA. They're telling you 'bullshit' earnings."2002 Meeting
  • "Does management think the tooth fairy pays for capital expenditures?"
  • "Even a high school dropout knows that to finance a car he must have income that covers not only interest and operating expenses, but also realistically-calculated depreciation."

📅 2015: The Pinocchio Warning + Stock Compensation Critique

The EBITDA Escalation

The 2015 letter contains the most quotable EBITDA critique Buffett has written: "When CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses lengthen while they speak."

The Amortization Nuance

Berkshire's $1.1B annual GAAP amortization contains two categories:

  • Real (~20%): Amortization of software, customer contracts that genuinely decay — these are real economic costs.
  • Non-Real (~80%): "Customer relationships" amortized from purchase accounting — a mathematical fiction required by accounting rules. When Berkshire acquires a business, GAAP assigns a value to relationships and then amortizes that value over time. But the actual economic relationship does not follow that schedule.

The Depreciation Nuance (BNSF)

In contrast, BNSF's GAAP depreciation charge understates true economic depreciation — because capital required to maintain competitive service is greater than what GAAP records. "In 51 years I've yet to figure out how to spend less than our depreciation charge and keep our businesses competitive." This reinforces that depreciation treatment requires business-by-business judgment.

Stock Compensation: The Bigger Crime

"The most egregious form of accounting tomfoolery involves stock-based compensation." Analysts who strip stock comp from earnings to present 'non-GAAP' results are:

  1. Either ignorant of what compensation means
  2. Or deliberately misleading investors to protect management access "If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don't belong in the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they belong?" 2015 Letter

📅 2017: "Mass Delusion" and "Horror Squared"

In the 2017 Meeting, Buffett and Munger escalated their rhetoric against EBITDA.

  • Buffett's View: He described EBITDA as a "mass delusion" heavily promoted by Wall Street because it artificially inflates valuations and borrowing capacity. He stressed that depreciation is "reverse float" (money spent upfront before the benefit is received), making it the worst kind of expense to ignore.
  • Munger's View: Munger stated that Buffett understated the issue, calling the teaching and use of EBITDA a "horror squared" and describing the promoters of the metric as "disgusting."

🌱 Idea Evolution & Maturity

How this concept developed over time, tracking its transformation from an early practice to a formalized Berkshire pillar.

📊 Interactive Heatmap & Comparison →
1
Seed Stage

The Rise of Leverage

1980 - 1989
Strategic Catalyst
The LBO craze and junk bond era of the 1980s.
Operational Shift

Buffett observes Wall Street inventing new metrics to justify lending massive amounts of debt to companies.

Philosophical Shift

A skepticism of any accounting metric that ignores the real costs of doing business.

It is a fundamental error to ignore depreciation.

1989 Letter
2
Named Stage

The Tooth Fairy Critique

1990 - 1999
Strategic Catalyst
The telecom and cable industry build-outs.
Operational Shift

Buffett formally attacks EBITDA, explicitly stating that depreciation is a real cash expense over time.

Philosophical Shift

EBITDA is viewed as a deceptive tool used by investment bankers to dress up 'pigs' for sale.

Does management think the tooth fairy pays for capital expenditures?

2000 Letter
3
Defined Stage

The Earnings Distorter

2000 - 2008
Strategic Catalyst
The Dot-Com bubble accounting scandals.
Operational Shift

Buffett uses the term 'EBITDA' exclusively as a pejorative, warning shareholders that any management team using the metric is either ignorant or deceptive.

Philosophical Shift

The rejection of EBITDA is tied directly to the concept of 'Owner Earnings'—you cannot understand a business if you ignore capital expenditures.

References to EBITDA make us shudder... it is a highly misleading metric.

2002 Letter
4
Mature Stage

Permanent Red Flag

2009 - Present
Strategic Catalyst
The continued dominance of private equity using EBITDA.
Operational Shift

EBITDA is permanently blacklisted in Berkshire's analysis. Any offering memo featuring it is instantly discarded.

Philosophical Shift

A company's willingness to use EBITDA is a negative indicator of corporate culture and management integrity.

When CEOs tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, wire them up for a polygraph.

2014 Letter

📚 Historical Mentions & Citations (5)

Click a reference document below to expand and read the exact paragraph(s) containing this concept in the archive.

📜
1989 LetterReference Only

Mentioned in this document.

🎙️
2002 MeetingExcerpt Available
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I mean, it’s a very good question. It’s tough to answer. But I will tell you that we haven’t, and we won’t get defrauded often. Now, that may mean we pass up a whole lot of other opportunities, too. But, for example, you raised the question about cash flow. I would say the number of times we’re going to buy into a company, whether it’s through stocks or through the entire company, where people are talking about EBITDA, is going to be about zero. I mean, we start out with — if somebody’s talking about EBITDA, you know — if we take all the people in the world that talk about EBITDA and all the people in the world who haven’t talked about EBITDA, there are more frauds in the first group, percentage-wise, by a substantial margin. Very substantial. I mean, it is, you know, it’s just a start. Now, that isn’t — you know, that — it’s very interesting to me. WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that often happens. I mean, if you set out to con somebody, after a while you con yourself, which is why some of the people in the internet stocks, you know, stayed with them. It’s — if somebody is — if they think you’re focusing on EBITDA, they may arrange things so that that number looks bigger than it really is. It’s bigger than it really is, anyway. I mean, the implication of that number is it has great meaning. You take telecoms, they’re spending every dime that comes in, I mean, in many cases. There isn’t — it isn’t cash flow. I mean, the cash is flowing out. But it — you know, you can look at the statement and there’s billions of dollars, supposedly, in depreciation and so on. But there — you know, interest is an expense. Actually, taxes are going to be an expense. Anybody that tells us that making a lot of money before taxes, in terms of EBITDA, is meaningful — you know, you get depreciation by laying out money ahead of time.
📜
2015 LetterExcerpt Available
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/ interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.) Depreciation charges are a more complicated subject but are almost always true costs. Certainly they are at Berkshire. I wish we could keep our businesses competitive while spending less than our depreciation charge, but in 51 years I’ve yet to figure out how to do so. Indeed, the depreciation charge we record in our railroad business falls far short of the capital outlays needed to merely keep the railroad running properly, a mismatch that leads to GAAP earnings that are higher than true economic earnings. (This overstatement of earnings exists at all railroads.) When CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses lengthen while they speak.
📜
2016 LetterExcerpt Available
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 6:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
🎙️
2017 MeetingExcerpt Available
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Andy Lijun Lin from Loyal Valley Innovation Capital from Shanghai. This is my sixth year from Shanghai to here. I have say — I have to say to you two, Warren and Charlie, you are highly respected and deeply loved by millions and millions, or even billions, globally. I have two questions today. First question, in your letters to shareholders you said you believe EBITDA is not a good parameter to value a business. Why it’s not? Can you elaborate on that? Second question, you both have very successful and happy lives with great respect. My question is to each of you. In retrospect, from a personal standpoint, do you have regrets in life? If there is one thing you could have done differently in your life, family, personal, or business, what is it? Thank you very much. WARREN BUFFETT: In respect to EBITDA, depreciation is an expense. And it’s the worst kind of an expense. You know, we love to talk about float. And float is where we get the money first and we have the expense later. Depreciation is where you spend the money first, you know, and, then, record the expense later. And it’s reverse float. And it’s not a good thing. And to have that enter into a multiple — it’s much better to buy a business that has, everything else being equal — has no depreciation because it has, essentially, no investment and fixed assets that makes X, than it is to buy a company where there’s a lot of depreciation in getting to X. And I — actually, I may write a little bit more on that next year, just because it’s such a mass delusion. And, of course, it’s in the interests of Wall Street, enormously, to focus on something called EBITDA because it results in higher borrowing power, higher valuations, and all of that sort of thing.