Stock Option Critique
📍 Origin
Buffett's critique of executive stock options has two distinct phases. The structural critique — that standard fixed-price options reward retained earnings rather than managerial outperformance — was introduced in the 1985 Letter. The critique received its most prominent public meeting elaboration at the 1997 Meeting, where Buffett and Munger extended it to the industry's lobbying against option-expensing rules — framing accounting non-disclosure as an institutional lie. The accounting critique — that failing to expense options is a definitional impossibility — was sharpened most clearly in the 1998 Letter in conjunction with the Levitt "Numbers Game" endorsement, and reached its most memorable formulation there.
🧠 The Core Argument
Phase 1 — The Structural Problem (1985):
- The Premise: Standard fixed-price options reward managers for the natural accumulation of retained earnings, not for superior management.
- The Mechanism: If a company earns and retains capital at a consistent rate, book value grows arithmetically — even with zero improvement in management quality. A 10-year option at today's price gives the manager the right to profit from this natural compounding, which is the owners' money, not the manager's achievement.
- The Conclusion: A "managerial Rip Van Winkle, ready to doze for ten years, could not wish for a better 'incentive' system." Options at fixed prices reward tenure, not performance.
Phase 2 — The Accounting Problem (1998):
- The Premise: Options have value (otherwise they wouldn't be granted). Value transferred to employees is compensation. Compensation is an expense.
- The Mechanism: The chain of definitions is unbreakable. The only way to avoid charging options as an expense is to pretend one of the definitions in the chain is false. The lobbying campaign against FAS 123R did exactly that — arguing, with sophisticated-sounding technical cover, that options grants are not expenses.
- The Conclusion: Reported earnings that exclude option grants as compensation are overstated by exactly the value transferred. The cost doesn't disappear; it is transferred invisibly to shareholders through dilution.
📅 Chronological Evolution
- 1985 (Letter): The structural critique introduced. Fixed-price options reward the "sluggard" equally with the "star." The Berkshire alternative: unit-based bonuses tied to controllable results, independent of the stock price. Ralph Schey at Scott Fetzer as the canonical example.
- 1998 (Letter): The accounting critique crystallized as part of the Levitt "Numbers Game" endorsement. The most famous formulation: "If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it?" This was written three years before the options-expensing controversy became a national political battle.
- 2001 (Letter): The quote appears in a slightly different form in the 2001 Letter, where Buffett uses it to attack the failure to expense options as an accounting fraud of the same type as the Earnings Management practices he had warned about in 1998.
- 2002 (Meeting): The "Piano in a Whorehouse" analogy. Tech industry lobbyists argued that expensing options and accounting for their dilution was "double counting." Buffett dismissed this as sophistication in service of deception. "It's like the piano player in the whorehouse... he thinks he's just there for the music."
- 2004 (Meeting): The "Indiana Pi" analogy. A bill in the U.S. House of Representatives attempted to limit option expensing requirements. Buffett compared it to the 1897 Indiana legislature that tried to legislate π = 3.2. Congress can pass the law; it cannot change the mathematical reality.
💬 Primary Source Quotes
"If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?" — Buffett, 1998 Letter
"A managerial Rip Van Winkle, ready to doze for ten years, could not wish for a better 'incentive' system." — Buffett, 1985 Letter
"It's like the piano player in the whorehouse... he thinks he's just there for the music." — Buffett, 2002 Meeting
🔗 Connections
- Related Concepts: Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, Compensation Logic, Management Incentives, Accounting Earnings vs Economic Earnings
- Related Entities: Ralph Schey, Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger
- Key Sources: 1985 Letter, 1998 Letter, 2001 Letter, 2002 Meeting, 2004 Meeting
- Index: index
🌱 Idea Evolution & Maturity
How this concept developed over time, tracking its transformation from an early practice to a formalized Berkshire pillar.
Early Dislike
Buffett notices that options cost the company money but aren't being expensed on the income statement.
If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it?
If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they?
The Accounting Crusade
Buffett formally crusades against the accounting rules that allow companies to grant options without expensing them.
Options are a massive, hidden transfer of wealth from shareholders to management.
When a company gives something of value to its employees in return for their services, it is clearly a compensation expense.
The Lottery Ticket Critique
Buffett argues that options are flawed incentives because they reward executives for general market rises, not specific business performance.
A rising tide lifts all boats; executives shouldn't get rich just because the market went up.
Stock options are often a lottery ticket that rewards managers for the general upward drift of the market.
The Berkshire Alternative
Buffett wins the accounting debate. Berkshire continues to never use stock options, instead tying compensation to specific business unit performance.
True alignment comes from paying for specific performance or having executives buy stock with their own money.
We have never issued a stock option at Berkshire, and we never will.