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General Re (Gen Re)
📝 Overview
Acquired in December 1998 for approximately $22 Billion (settled in Berkshire stock), General Re was the largest acquisition in Berkshire’s history to that point. The deal transformed Berkshire from a company with a strong insurance core into a global reinsurance giant.
🏢 Business Role (1998)
- Purchase Price: ~$22 Billion (all stock).
- Float Contribution: Added over $14.9 Billion to Berkshire’s float.
- Strategic Fit: Buffett noted that General Re’s large float combined with Berkshire’s unequaled capital strength created a formidable competitive advantage, as Gen Re could take on risks that competitors couldn't.
🏚️ 1999–2001: The Underwriting Nightmare
Shortly after the acquisition, General Re faced a triple-threat crisis that severely tested Berkshire’s resilience.
- Cultural Erosion: The "pricing for profit" discipline that had made Gen Re legendary in previous decades had eroded. The focus shifted to premium volume, leading to massive under-pricing of multi-year risks.
- The Noah Principle Failure: In the 2001 Letter, Buffett criticized Gen Re for accurately "predicting rain" (terrorist risks) but failing to "build an ark" (limiting aggregation or pricing exposure appropriately).
- The World Trade Center Loss: Gen Re bore a significant portion of Berkshire’s $2.4 billion loss from the 9/11 attacks, a loss exacerbated by the previous failure to cap aggregate exposures.
🛡️ 2001–2003: "Honor Restored"
Buffett acted decisively in late 2001 to save the subsidiary from terminal decline.
- New Leadership: Joe Brandon (CEO) and Tad Montross (President) were appointed with a mandate to restore the firm's underwriting soul.
- The Turnaround: By 2002, Buffett noted that "the old Gen Re" had been honorably restored. Premium volume was sacrificed in exchange for high-discipline pricing.
- Validation: In 2003, the subsidiary achieved its first pre-tax underwriting profit in years, proving that the culture could be "fixed" with the right leadership and a focus on Insurance Principles.
💣 The GRS "Daisy Chain"
General Re also brought with it General Re Securities (GRS), a massive derivatives book that became a persistent drag.
- The Warning: The difficulty and expense of liquidating the 23,218 contracts in GRS informed Buffett's famous "Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction" warning in the 2002 Letter.
- The Exit: Buffett characterized the wind-down as "slow, expensive and painful," confirming his belief that derivatives are "easy to enter but almost impossible to exit."
🏢 Management Timeline
- Ron Ferguson: CEO until 2001.
- Joe Brandon: CEO 2001–2008.
- Tad Montross: President/CEO 2001–2016. Turnaround architect.
- Kara Raiguel: CEO from 2016. Promoted internally upon Montross's retirement.
🔄 2016: The Montross Succession
Tad Montross retired in 2016 after 39 years with General Re, representing one of the longest and most consequential tenures in Berkshire's managerial universe. He joined as a turnaround partner with Joe Brandon in September 2001 and spent 15 years rebuilding the firm's underwriting discipline from its 9/11-era nadir to a consistent profit machine.
2016 Performance: Float $17.7B; underwriting profit $190M — one of General Re's strongest years.
Raiguel's Context: She inherits a structurally challenged reinsurance market — excess global capacity, near-zero or negative interest rates in Europe depressing float returns, and growing competition from alternative capital sources. Buffett sold Berkshire's stakes in Munich Re and Swiss Re in 2015–2016 citing these structural headwinds, though he maintained confidence in General Re's superior flexibility within the Berkshire ecosystem.
🔗 Links
- Entities: Joe Brandon, Ron Ferguson, Tad Montross, Kara Raiguel, Warren Buffett, Ajit Jain
- Concepts: Insurance Float, Insurance Principles, Noah Rule, Experience vs Exposure, Derivatives, Succession Planning
- Sources: 1998 Letter, 2001 Letter, 2002 Letter, 2003 Letter, 2016 Letter
📚 Historical Mentions & Citations (27)
Click a reference document below to expand and read the exact paragraph(s) containing this concept in the archive.
📜1998 LetterExcerpt Available▼
1998 LetterExcerpt Available
We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses and managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998, General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way — more about both later — and the performance of our operating businesses last year exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.
In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a table that we regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.
🎙️1998 MeetingReference Only▼
1998 MeetingReference Only
Mentioned in this document.
📜1999 LetterExcerpt Available▼
1999 LetterExcerpt Available
In 1999, our per-share investments changed very little, but our operating earnings, affected by negatives that overwhelmed some strong positives, fell apart. Most of our operating managers deserve a grade of A for delivering fine results and for having widened the difference between the intrinsic value of their businesses and the value at which these are carried on our balance sheet. But, offsetting this, we had a huge — and, I believe, aberrational — underwriting loss at General Re. Additionally, GEICO’s underwriting profit fell, as we had predicted it would. GEICO’s overall performance, though, was terrific, outstripping my ambitious goals.
We do not expect our underwriting earnings to improve in any dramatic way this year. Though GEICO’s intrinsic value should grow by a highly satisfying amount, its underwriting performance is almost certain to weaken. That’s because auto insurers, as a group, will do worse in 2000, and because we will materially increase our marketing expenditures. At General Re, we are raising rates and, if there is no mega-catastrophe in 2000, the company’s underwriting loss should fall considerably. It takes some time, however, for the full effect of rate increases to kick in, and General Re is therefore likely to have another unsatisfactory underwriting year.
🎙️1999 MeetingExcerpt Available▼
1999 MeetingExcerpt Available
WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to make one comment before we proceed to the election of directors. And that’s that in the General Re proxy material, material relating to the General Re merger, it was stated that the intention was to have Ron Ferguson, the CEO of General Re, join the board of Berkshire Hathaway. And that offer was extended, and still remains open, and will remain open for his lifetime and mine, at least, for Ron to join the board. After thinking about it, he decided that he preferred not to be on the board. And in that judgment, he concurs with my feelings, generally, about boards, in that they can restrict your — it can restrict your activities in purchase and sale of a stock. For example, if you do it in a six-month period, then you’re automatically in trouble with the — and you have to return any profit, as calculated in a rather peculiar way, to the company. It means that your compensation system is laid out for the world to see. There may be some tax restrictions, in terms of the deductibility of salary paid.
The second question, as to the growth of float, the growth of float at General Re and Cologne will certainly be very slow in the short term. The growth of float at GEICO will be significant, percentage-wise. The reinsurance business does not have the same potential for growth as we have at GEICO. And growth is much slower to come about, because there are longer-term contractual commitments — that people are reluctant to change reinsurers. And they should be. We agree with that. So you — at a level of 6 billion or so of premium volume and already 14 billion of float, you won’t have growth of float unless premium volume is — becomes significantly higher in the future. I think that will happen over time. It will not happen in the short term. Charlie? If I may interrupt your breakfast? (Laughter)
📜2000 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2000 LetterExcerpt Available
• Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized, highly-respected writer of unusual risks — “excess and surplus lines” in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal.
Yearend Float (in $ millions) Year GEICO General Re Other Reinsurance Other Primary Total 1967 20 20 1977 40 131 171 1987 701 807 1,508 1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386 1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754 1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298 2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871
📜2001 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2001 LetterExcerpt Available
Though our corporate performance last year was satisfactory, my performance was anything but. I manage most of Berkshire’s equity portfolio, and my results were poor, just as they have been for several years. Of even more importance, I allowed General Re to take on business without a safeguard I knew was important, and on September 11th, this error caught up with us. I’ll tell you more about my mistake later and what we are doing to correct it.
Yearend Float (in $ millions) Year GEICO General Re Other Reinsurance Other Primary Total 1967 20 20 1977 40 131 171 1987 701 807 1,508 1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386 1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754 1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298 2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871 2001 4,251 19,310 11,262 685 35,508
🎙️2001 MeetingExcerpt Available▼
2001 MeetingExcerpt Available
You can’t cap workers’ compensation losses. I mean, they —you can as a reinsurer, but I mean, the primary insurer can’t do that. I believe in auto, for example, in the U.K., that it’s uncapped. And I think that nobody thought that was very serious until they had a recent accident that caused — I think it involved a car doing something that — an auto doing something to a train that was unbelievable. So they — there are a few areas where insurance is written on an uncapped basis. And in our case, we write some auto insurance in the U.K. and we write some workers’ compensation, primarily in California. But generally, in the reinsurance business, you are capping the liabilities you take on. I mean, obviously, when we bought General Re, they had asbestos liabilities from reinsurance contracts they had written. But the reinsurance companies are pretty careful about writing unlimited policies. We write huge limits. We’re the biggest — you know, if somebody wants to write a huge limit, or an unusual limit, they should call us.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Chip Mann (PH) from Minneapolis, Minnesota. Thanks again for this open format and your direct answers to our questions. You’ve talked a bit about the super-cat class level of risk that you write. Could you share your thoughts about expanding the competitive advantage and the scale advantages at General Re, referring more to their traditional or historical franchise and the type of contracts they would write?
📜2002 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2002 LetterExcerpt Available
Our insurance group increased its float to $41.2 billion, a hefty gain of $5.7 billion. Better yet, the use of these funds in 2002 cost us only 1%. Getting back to low-cost float feels good, particularly after our poor results during the three previous years. Berkshire’s reinsurance division and GEICO shot the lights out in 2002, and underwriting discipline was restored at General Re. * Berkshire acquired some important new businesses — with economic characteristics ranging from good to great, run by managers ranging from great to great. Those attributes are two legs of our “entrance” strategy, the third being a sensible purchase price. Unlike LBO operators and private equity firms, we have no “exit” strategy — we buy to keep. That’s one reason why Berkshire is usually the first — and sometimes the only — choice for sellers and their managers.
Yearend Float (in $ millions) Year GEICO General Re Other Reinsurance Other Primary Total 1967 20 20 1977 40 131 171 1987 701 807 1,508 1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386 1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754 1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298 2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871 2001 4,251 19,310 11,262 685 35,508 2002 4,678 22,207 13,396 943 41,224
🎙️2002 MeetingExcerpt Available▼
2002 MeetingExcerpt Available
WARREN BUFFETT: I believe, and I hope we have Larry and Dolores Brandon. Are they here? Show your — there they are. Let’s have a spotlight on them. (Applause) Delores is also known as “Dutchy” but we call her “Saint Dutchy” at Berkshire headquarters because she gave birth some years ago to Joe Brandon, and Joe has been doing a fabulous job for us at General Re. He took over early in September. It’s really going to be our number one asset. There’re been a lot happened since those days in September when Joe took over. I think you’re going to see some terrific results throughout our insurance business, but particularly at General Re. I wrote Dutchy a letter and I said, you know, it’s terrific what you’ve done for us, but — you know, I was a little like the farmer that went into the henhouse, and I, you know, pulled out an ostrich egg, and said to the hens, you know, I don’t like to complain, but this is just a sample of what the competition’s doing.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in a sense, float is somewhat similar to being in the oil business. I mean, you know, every day, some goes out as you pay claims, and the question is, did you find more oil than you produced that day? And it’s very relevant. It’s a good question to, you know, what is the permanence of the float? What is the cost of the float? What’s the likelihood of it growing? Could it actually run off? As you saw up on the slide, we have $37 billion-plus of float. I think we have more float in our property-casualty business. A little bit of that float is in General Re’s life and health business, but very small. So, basically you’re looking at property-casualty float when you look at that 37 billion. I believe that’s more than any company has in the United States and it’s possible — I haven’t checked Swiss Re and Munich — but it’s even possible it’s larger than anybody in the world.
📜2003 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2003 LetterExcerpt Available
Yearend Float (in $ millions) Year GEICO General Re Other Reinsurance Other Primary Total 1967 20 20 1977 40 131 171 1987 701 807 1,508 1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386 1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754 1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298 2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871 2001 4,251 19,310 11,262 685 35,508 2002 4,678 22,207 13,396 943 41,224 2003 5,287 23,654 13,948 1,331 44,220
• General Re had been Berkshire’s problem child in the years following our acquisition of it in 1998. Unfortunately, it was a 400-pound child, and its negative impact on our overall performance was large.
🎙️2003 MeetingExcerpt Available▼
2003 MeetingExcerpt Available
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s where we like to be, right. It’s interesting, we inherited some stock options at Berkshire, primarily in the General Re transaction. And, not through any failing of anybody or — there’s no aspersions to be cast at all, but those options turned out to be quite valuable. They would not have been valuable if General Re had been left alone as a standalone company. They were — they profited from the fact that other parts of Berkshire did well, and the money went to the people that had these options who delivered nothing to the performance of Berkshire for a while. Now, that’s — that is not an indictment of anybody, in the least, at Gen Re. It’s an indictment of an options system which represents a lottery ticket, and also a royalty on the passage of time. Because as you know, an option holder has benefits from retained earnings and benefits not at all from dividends. And that puts his interest, maybe, quite contrary to that of the shareholders. So we believe in paying for performance, but we believe in tying performance to what is actually under the reasonable control of the person that’s being measured.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. My name is Olaf Heine (PH) from Germany. And not surprisingly, I have a question concerning the German reinsurance market, fitting nicely in the context of the questions before. When you acquired General Re, I believe you inherited, also, a substantial stake in Cologne Re. Now in your last letter to your shareholders, you hinted that a major reinsurance company might be in trouble, widely believed to be Gerling Re, just mentioned. You also mentioned, about an hour ago, that Germany was kind of a drag insurance-wise — (laughs) — if you are — if I understand you correctly.
📜2004 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2004 LetterExcerpt Available
Though the hurricanes hit us with a $1.25 billion loss, our reinsurance operations did well last year. At General Re, Joe Brandon has restored a long-admired culture of underwriting discipline that, for a time, had lost its way. The excellent results he realized in 2004 on current business, however, were offset by adverse developments from the years before he took the helm. At NICO’s reinsurance operation, Ajit Jain continues to successfully underwrite huge risks that no other reinsurer is willing or able to accept. Ajit’s value to Berkshire is enormous.
(in $ millions) Insurance Operations Underwriting Profit Yearend Float 2004 2003 2004 General Re $ 3 $23,120 $23,654 B-H Reinsurance 417 15,278 13,948 GEICO 970 5,960 5,287 Other Primary* 161 1,736 1,331 Total $1,551 $46,094 $44,220
🎙️2004 MeetingReference Only▼
2004 MeetingReference Only
Mentioned in this document.
📜2005 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2005 LetterExcerpt Available
We have major reinsurance operations at General Re and National Indemnity. The former is run by Joe Brandon and Tad Montross, the latter by Ajit Jain. Both units performed well in 2005 considering the extraordinary hurricane losses that battered the industry.
(in $ millions) Insurance Operations Underwriting Profit (Loss) Yearend Float 2005 2004 2005 2004 General Re $( 334) $ 3 $22,920 $23,120 B-H Reinsurance (1,069) 417 16,233 15,278 GEICO 1,221 970 6,692 5,960 Other Primary 235* 161 3,442 1,736 Total $ 53 $1,551 $49,287 $46,094
🎙️2005 MeetingExcerpt Available▼
2005 MeetingExcerpt Available
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, that’s a very good question because we are doing things in different parts of our insurance operation where there is correlation. And there’s not only correlation among the insurance risks. I mean, just, you know, take a major, really major, earthquake in California, in the wrong place. There have been about 25 6.0s or larger in the last hundred years, but most of them don’t occur where a lot of people are. But if you get the wrong one in the wrong place, it would not only hit National Indemnity and General Re, as you mention, but it might very well have a severe effect on See’s Candy. It might very well have a severe effect on Wells Fargo. We don’t own Freddie [Mac] or Fannie [Mae] now, but we owned Freddie at one time. It could have had a severe effect on Freddie. It can have all kinds of secondary and tertiary effects that you might not think of initially. So, we find when there’s trouble, everything correlates.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. General Re, at the time we bought it in 1998, owned something in the 80s of Cologne Re, a large German company that they bought this 80-odd percent in, a few years earlier. It’s actually slightly more complicated than that because there was an arrangement where a certain purchase was deferred, but as a practical matter they owned in the 80s. Right now, Gen Re owns about 91 percent of Cologne Re. That’s a subject that, obviously, it’s not pressing with us, because we’ve owned it for seven years without taking our interest up, except periodically through small purchases. And there’s no particular reason to — why 100 would be better than 91 percent. But if the price is attractive and shares are offered to us, we will always contemplate buying it. But it’s not key to any strategy.
📜2006 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2006 LetterExcerpt Available
In 2006, though, everything went right in insurance — really right. Our managers — Tony Nicely (GEICO), Ajit Jain (B-H Reinsurance), Joe Brandon and Tad Montross (General Re), Don Wurster (National Indemnity Primary), Tom Nerney (U.S. Liability), Tim Kenesey (Medical Protective), Rod Eldred (Homestate Companies and Cypress), Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies (Applied Underwriters), John Kizer (Central States) and Don Towle (Kansas Bankers Surety) — simply shot the lights out. When I recite their names, I feel as if I’m at Cooperstown, reading from the Hall of Fame roster. Of course, the overall insurance industry also had a terrific year in 2006. But our managers delivered results generally superior to those of their competitors.
(in $ millions) Insurance Operations Underwriting Profit (Loss) Yearend Float 2006 2005 2006 2005 General Re $ 526 $( 334) $22,827 $22,920 B-H Reinsurance 1,658 (1,069) 16,860 16,233 GEICO 1,314 1,221 7,171 6,692 Other Primary 340** 235* 4,029 3,442 Total $3,838 $ 53 $50,887 $49,287
🎙️2006 MeetingReference Only▼
2006 MeetingReference Only
Mentioned in this document.
📜2007 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2007 LetterExcerpt Available
General Re, our international reinsurer, is by far our largest source of “home-grown” float — $23 billion at yearend. This operation is now a huge asset for Berkshire. Our ownership, however, had a shaky start.
For decades, General Re was the Tiffany of reinsurers, admired by all for its underwriting skills and discipline. This reputation, unfortunately, outlived its factual underpinnings, a flaw that I completely missed when I made the decision in 1998 to merge with General Re. The General Re of 1998 was not operated as the General Re of 1968 or 1978.
📜2008 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2008 LetterExcerpt Available
General Re, our large international reinsurer, also had an outstanding year in 2008. Some time back, the company had serious problems (which I totally failed to detect when we purchased it in late 1998). By 2001, when Joe Brandon took over as CEO, assisted by his partner, Tad Montross, General Re’s culture had further deteriorated, exhibiting a loss of discipline in underwriting, reserving and expenses. After Joe and Tad took charge, these problems were decisively and successfully addressed. Today General Re has regained its luster. Last spring Joe stepped down, and Tad became CEO. Charlie and I are grateful to Joe for righting the ship and are certain that, with Tad, General Re’s future is in the best of hands.
Reinsurance is a business of long-term promises, sometimes extending for fifty years or more. This past year has retaught clients a crucial principle: A promise is no better than the person or institution making it. That’s where General Re excels: It is the only reinsurer that is backed by an AAA corporation. Ben Franklin once said, “It’s difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.” That’s no worry for General Re clients.
📜2011 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2011 LetterExcerpt Available
We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. In the first few years after we acquired it, General Re was a major headache. Now it’s a treasure.
📜2015 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2015 LetterExcerpt Available
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
🎙️2015 MeetingReference Only▼
2015 MeetingReference Only
Mentioned in this document.
📜2016 LetterExcerpt Available▼
2016 LetterExcerpt Available
Unfortunately, I followed the GEICO purchase by foolishly using Berkshire stock — a boatload of stock — to buy General Reinsurance in late 1998. After some early problems, General Re has become a fine insurance operation that we prize. It was, nevertheless, a terrible mistake on my part to issue 272,200 shares of Berkshire in buying General Re, an act that increased our outstanding shares by a whopping 21.8%. My error caused Berkshire shareholders to give far more than they received (a practice that — despite the Biblical endorsement — is far from blessed when you are buying businesses).
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed until recently by Tad Montross. After 39 years at General Re, Tad retired in 2016. Tad was a class act in every way and we owe him a ton of thanks. Kara Raiguel, who has worked with Ajit for 16 years, is now CEO of General Re.
🎙️2016 MeetingExcerpt Available▼
2016 MeetingExcerpt Available
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Solomon Ackerman, who’s in Frankfurt, Germany. He wants to know why Berkshire has significantly sold down their holdings in Munich Re, which is the world’s biggest reinsurance company, based in Germany, while sticking with the reinsurance operations within Berkshire, like Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance and General Re. Would you reduce exposure to Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance and General Re if they were listed companies? And he’s hoping that this can bring out some of your insights as to what’s happening in the reinsurance business right now.
GREGG WARREN: Warren, the announcement earlier this month, that Ajit Jain would be taking over responsibility for all of Berkshire’s reinsurance efforts once Tad Montross retires from General Re, has raised some questions about not only the change in leadership structure but succession planning. Given the state of the reinsurance market, it makes sense to have Ajit overseeing both businesses, especially if the pricing environment expected to be difficult for another ten years, and there are duplicative efforts that can be streamlined. Given this move and the change in responsibilities we’ve seen at several of Berkshire’s subsidiaries the last few years, I was just wondering if you could just give us some color on how succession planning is handled at the subsidiary level, and any insight you could give us into what led you to finally decide to have Ajit oversee both of Berkshire’s reinsurance arms, and whether or not it will change the amount of work you’ll be doing on the specialty side of the business, would be greatly appreciated.
📜2020 LetterReference Only▼
2020 LetterReference Only
Mentioned in this document.
📜2022 LetterReference Only▼
2022 LetterReference Only
Mentioned in this document.
🎙️2022 MeetingReference Only▼
2022 MeetingReference Only
Mentioned in this document.