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Energy Future Holdings (EFH)

Energy Future Holdings (formerly TXU Corp) is the subject of one of Warren Buffett's most significant and publicly acknowledged capital allocation errors. Berkshire invested approximately $2 billion in EFH junior bonds, an investment that ultimately resulted in a substantial pre-tax loss.

๐Ÿ Origin & The Thesis

In 2007, EFH was the target of a record-breaking $45 billion leveraged buyout led by KKR, TPG, and Goldman Sachs. Berkshire purchased ~$2 billion of the company's 10.875% junior bonds.

The investment was not a typical Berkshire "moat" play, but a commodity bet:

  • The Bet: Buffett assumed that natural gas prices would rise, which would drive up the price of electricity and allow the highly-leveraged EFH to service its massive debt.
  • The Error: Natural gas prices crashed over the following years (due to the fracking revolution), and EFHโ€™s revenue was insufficient to cover its interest obligations.

๐Ÿš€ Strategic Importance (as a Lesson)

Buffett used EFH in the 2011 Letter as a "teachable moment" for shareholders:

  • Idiosyncratic Failure: He admitted that he purchased the bonds without consulting Charlie Munger. "That was a big mistake," he noted, emphasizing that Mungerโ€™s skepticism might have caught the flaw in the commodity-price assumption.
  • The Institutional Imperative: The deal was part of a massive, fashionable LBO wave. Buffett's participation showed that even he was not immune to occasional errors of judgment when departing from his core strictly-defined circle of competence (predictable cash flows vs. commodity predictions).

๐Ÿ“ˆ Outcome

  • 2013-2014: Berkshire sold the EFH bonds for $259 million in 2013, avoiding the total wipeout when EFH filed for bankruptcy in 2014.
  • The Loss: Berkshire finalized a pre-tax loss of $873 million on the investment. While the loss was small in the context of Berkshire's total capital, it remains one of the largest single-investment losses in Buffett's career, cementing the lesson of straying outside the Circle of Competence.

๐Ÿ”— Connections

[!WARNING] EFH stands as a stark reminder that even the world's most disciplined capital allocator can fail when betting on commodity price directions rather than durable competitive advantages.

๐Ÿ“š Historical Mentions & Citations (2)

Click a reference document below to expand and read the exact paragraph(s) containing this concept in the archive.

๐Ÿ“œ
2011 LetterExcerpt Available
โ–ผ
A few years back, I spent about $2 billion buying several bond issues of Energy Future Holdings, an electric utility operation serving portions of Texas. That was a mistake โ€” a big mistake. In large measure, the companyโ€™s prospects were tied to the price of natural gas, which tanked shortly after our purchase and remains depressed. Though we have annually received interest payments of about $102 million since our purchase, the companyโ€™s ability to pay will soon be exhausted unless gas prices rise substantially. We wrote down our investment by $1 billion in 2010 and by an additional $390 million last year.
๐Ÿ“œ
2013 LetterExcerpt Available
โ–ผ
Most of you have never heard of Energy Future Holdings. Consider yourselves lucky; I certainly wish I hadnโ€™t. The company was formed in 2007 to effect a giant leveraged buyout of electric utility assets in Texas. The equity owners put up $8 billion and borrowed a massive amount in addition. About $2 billion of the debt was purchased by Berkshire, pursuant to a decision I made without consulting with Charlie. That was a big mistake.