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Cost of Capital

In traditional corporate finance and academia, a company's "Cost of Capital" (often calculated as WACC - Weighted Average Cost of Capital) is used as a hurdle rate. A company is told to only pursue projects or acquisitions that yield a return higher than this calculated WACC.

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger explicitly reject this academic framework for Berkshire Hathaway.

💡 The Berkshire Definition: Opportunity Cost

At Berkshire Hathaway, the cost of capital is not derived from beta, risk-free rates, or complex theoretical formulas. Instead, the cost of capital is exclusively defined by Opportunity Cost.

"We don’t care about the cost of capital. We care about opportunity cost... I mean, if we’re making 15 cents on something and somebody comes along with something that makes 15 and a half cents, we take the 15 and a half cents." — Warren Buffett, 2014 Meeting

The absolute required return for a project is simply whatever the next best available use of that capital would yield. If Berkshire has $10 billion in cash, and the best available index fund or bond yields 4%, then a new acquisition must exceed 4%. If another acquisition is available yielding 10%, then the cost of capital for any other project becomes 10%.

📉 Rejection of WACC

Munger specifically ridicules WACC and the idea that a company has a fixed, calculable "cost of equity."

  1. False Precision: The formulas rely on historical price volatility (Beta) to determine the cost of equity, which Berkshire views as a flawed metric for risk (see Volatility vs Risk).
  2. Ignoring Reality: When cash is yielding 0% in Treasury bills (as it did following the 2008 crisis), stating a company's generic "cost of capital is 10%" might prevent management from making mildly accretive investments that are vastly superior to holding cash.

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📚 Historical Mentions & Citations (1)

Click a reference document below to expand and read the exact paragraph(s) containing this concept in the archive.

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2014 MeetingExcerpt Available
GREGG WARREN: Thank you. Warren and Charlie, on behalf of Morningstar, I want to thank you for having us on the panel this year. I may not be an accredited bear, but hopefully, I ask probing questions that add value for shareholders. My first question relates to the measurement of management performance. For Morningstar, the ultimate measure of success is not just whether or not a firm can earn more than its cost of capital, but whether or not it can do so for an extended period of time. Berkshire has historically done a good job of generating outsized returns. But as you’ve noted in the past, the sheer size of the firm’s operations, which continue to grow, will ultimately limit the returns that Berkshire could generate. With that in mind, what do you believe Berkshire’s cost of capital is? How much do you think that this hurdle rate is increased as you’ve acquired more capital intensive, debt-heavy firms? And how much confidence do you have that future capital allocators at Berkshire will be able to generate returns in excess of the firm’s cost of capital, acknowledging, of course, the fact that Berkshire’s days of outsized returns are most likely behind it? WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wish I had his lever because we don’t have that lever at Berkshire. So we — well, we’ll answer two questions there. In terms of cost of capital, Charlie and I always figure that our cost of capital is the — is what could be produced by our second best idea. And then our best idea has to exceed that. We think — I have listened to so many nonsensical cost of capital discussions, that —